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In Gabriel Garcia Marquez's novel, The General in his Labyrinth, a long-winded 
Frenchman lectures a pensive, dying Simon Bolivar. The Liberator responds. He acknowledges 
that the revolution unleashed the furies of avenging justice, and laments, without repudiating, his 
decision to order the execution of eight hundred Spanish prisoners in a single day, including 
pa.ti~nts in La Guaira' s 
moral authority to reproach me, for if any history is drowned in blood, indignity, and injustice, it 
is the history of Europe." When the Frenchman tries to interrupt, Bolivar puts down his cutlery 
\ 
and glares at his guest. "Damn it, please let us have our Middle Ages in peace!" he exclaimed.1 
These, of course, were Garc,a Marquez's words, not Bolivar's. But they echo Bolivar's 
requiem on the events he shaped about the relationship between savagery and state-formation. 
More than lofty proclamations or principle's of statehood, the historical memory of the years 
leading to 1821 are saturated with blood. For the chroniclers and epic writers, from Jose Manuel, 
Restrepo's (1827) Historia de la Revolucion de Colombi~ to Garcia Marquez, the scenes of 
violence and carnage gave rise to narratives of sacrifice and struggle that could not be wholly 
redeemed by what came after. And yet, we have not thought very systematically about the 
significance of political violence in Latin America - despite its recurrence. Perhaps it is because 
of its recurrence: for so many, the cruelty was sown into a ''tradition'' of conquest and 
1 Gabriel Garda Marquez, The General in His Labyrinth (New York: Knopf, 1990), p. 124. 
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dictatorship, which did not require much analysis precisely because it was endowed with 
essential qualities. 
In spite ofthe centrality of violence to this era, it has not been an important subject of 
historical inquiry, with the exception of a shrinking circle of military historians. Since the 1960s, 
the combined influence of dependency approaches, Marxism, and the Annales-informed 
histories, diminished the evenementelle features of political life in favor of structuralist accounts 
- which more often focused on underlying continuities than ruptures. And what ruptures could 
be found were by-products of non-political shifts like the rise and fall of commercial emporia, 
the advent of free trade, and the proletarianization oflabor. In more recent years, the armed 
struggle has receded even more, for the rekindling of civilian rule in the 1980s, and a shift from 
concerns with exploitation to exclusion, sparked a revived interest in politics as a civic vocation. 
The births of the public sphere, ideas ofliberty, and new practices of representation have been 
treated as the source of fundamental breaks. Conventional, heroic, narratives have been 
displaced by a larger contexts, with important implications for how we understand the legal 
foundations of inequality and the conditions of democracy that helped legitimate them. 2 
How might we think of political violence more actively? One start is to expand the 
purview of political violence to include a broadened spectrum between the activities of standing 
armies on one end and other means to settle scores on the other, a space where crowds, bandidos, 
militiamen, and semi-organized mobs also struggled for control of state power - and against it. 
It may help to borrow and adapt from insights derived from the scholarship on early modem 
European violence, which has explored how angry crowds, riots, and rebellions exemplified a 
2 Antonio Annino & Rafael Rojas, La Independencia (Mexico: ClDE/FCE, 2008); John Charles Chasteen, Americanos: 
Latin America's Struggle for Independence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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pattern of outrage directed at authorities who failed to deliver on customary forms of justice; 
crowds, in this sense, took the place of governments, even if they were not necessarily calling for 
new regimes. The public violence in eighteenth-century Spanish America, from comunero 
takeovers to full-blown insurrections, conform to this model of a defense of a moral or spiritual 
economy against the perceived failures of its political guardians.3 
In time, however, large groups and their leaders fought for more than new governors, but 
for new governments. There was a fundamental shift in the course of the events collapsed under 
the category of revolution, which comes laden with its own historiographic baggage, not all of 
which was so celebratory, especially' when it came to considering the primus mobile, violence. 
Edmund Burke's warning that men who make their careers by seizing power through violent 
means to rid the world of evil cannot help but be consumed by their own devices acquired new 
significance in the wake of the tumults of the 1960s. Hannah Arendt's On Revolution captured 
the growing alarm about rising worldwide belligerence, and argued that violence did much more 
to destroy than to create. Echoes of her Jeremiad could be found among historians of the French 
Revolution, especially leading up to and during the debate about the bicentenary of 1789. For 
Franyois Furet, the Revolution was the work of ideological agents who created oppositions to 
them in order to justify primal bloodshed; once in place, the inner "logic" of revolution could 
only end in Terror. The events of 1789 predicted 1793, and eventually 1917 - but in a way that 
3 Classic studies include: George Rude, The Crowd in History: A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and 
England, 1730-1848 (New York: Wiley, 1964); Eric Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social 
Movement in the 19th and 20th centuries (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1959); E.P. Thompson, liThe 
Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century," Past and Present, 50:1 (Feb., 1971), pp. 76-136. 
For the new world, see William B. Taylor, Drinking, Homicide, and Rebellion in Colonial Mexican Villages (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1979), and more recently Sergio Serulnikov, Subverting Colonial Authority: Challenges to 
Spanish Rule in Eighteenth-Century Southern Andes (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2003). 
4 
overturned the redemptive genealogy on offer from the French Communist Party. Violence, in 
his view, was a vortex, and could lead nowhere butto Terrors and gulags.4 
The same temperament echoed through scholarship on Spanish America. Revolutions 
took what were ordered, stratified (if not necessarily happy) societies, and flattened them while 
creating a new archetype, for whom violence and not civility was dominant mode of politics: the 
caudillo. For John Johnson, this was the birth of a military "tradition." For others, violence 
upset what might have been a peaceable transformation, managed within the coordinates of a 
modernized trans-Atlantic Spanish constitutionalism. Once armed spoilers dominated the stage, 
the notion of gentlemanly, civic, change ceded brutality and extremism. Perhaps the most 
influential scholar operating in this scheme was, not coincidentally, working in France: the late 
Franyois-Xavier Guerra argued that the French Revolution disrupted the conceptual order across 
the Spanish empire, and that precocious experiences with modem representation were simply 
overwhelmed by colonial cognates for Paris' Jacobins. In a basic sense, the work on Spanish 
America's end of the ancien regime dovetailed with - and to some extent reflected -late-Cold 
War, shifts, especially disenchantments with socialism and revolution. 5 
The problem was that the cycle of violence did not itself require much explanation since 
it was endowed with a macabre ability to reproduce its own conditions. It was central to the 
master narrative of Spanish America's long history, and yet not a subject. This reluctance to 
4 Hannah Arendt, On Violence (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1969); Jim Wolfreys, "Twilight Revolution: Fran~ois 
Furet and the Manufacturing of Consensus," in Mike Haynes & Jim Wolfreys (eds.), History and Revolution 
(London: Verso, 2007), pp. 50-69; Stev;en Laurence Kaplan, Farewell Revolution: The Historians' Feud, France, 
1789/1989 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp, 12-24. 
5 John J Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); John Lynch, 
Caudillos in Spanish America, 1800-18'50 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Fran~ois-XavierGuerra, 
Modernidad e independencies: ensayos sobre las revoluciones hispanicas (Madrid: MAPFRE, 1992), There is a way 
in which Jaime Rodriguez D's important Independence in Spanish America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1998) echoes an aspect of this lament for a constitutional order that might have emerged from 1808 and the 
crippling of successor states and making them prey for new kinds of imperial predation. 
address role of primal bloodshed may now have passed. Perhaps, the end of the Cold War and 
the growing visibility of "state failure" and crimes against humanity have renewed attention to 
political violence because it is not treated as a simple explanandum of ideology. Perhaps, the 
anti-Marxist revisionism that was so determined to stigmatize revolutions tout cour has now had 
its run. Either way, new work casts new light. One recent world history of exterminatory 
violence associates it with the cults of territoriality and land.6 Arno Maier has posited that as the 
sacred buttresses of ancien regimes began to crumble and yielded to new ideological faiths, the 
agents of change and conservation resorted to arms, unleashing "the furies" of impassioned 
politics. Vengeance and terror were not simply "excesses," to be explained away by the 
! . 
psychology of cruelty. More recently, David Bell has argued that revolutionary violence sired 
the view that there could be a war to end all wars, which served as intellectual convictions to 
motivate total, exterminating warfare by the turn of the nineteenth century, whose butchery 
reached mass proportions in Napoleon's invasions of Spain and Russia. The study of civil wars, 
blood feuds, and reciprocal bloodletting by members of the same political communities, have 
illuminated how violence unfolds within societies without assuming that the making of modem 
states was about curbing primordial passions through what Norbert Elias called "the civilizing 
mission.,,7 
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This essay explores how politics became a matter of life and death. As local wars brewed 
within international ones, conflicts aggregated into civil war and mass killing that sliced through 
6 Ben Kiernan, Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from sparta to Darfur (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2007). 
7 Arno J Mayer, The Furies: Violence and Terror in the French and Russian Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2000); David Bell, The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Modern Warfare as We 
Know It (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2007). 
racial, ethnic, and religious divides. This essay seeks to put viciousness and massacring into 
context and to make some sense of the rhetoric of public cruelty. It ventures a few hypotheses. 
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First, the cycle went through discrete steps, and did not obey some fundamental logic of 
revolutions, as if one step anticipated the next in an irreversible sequence of escalating hatred. It 
will be important, if we are to avoid some of the Furet-style slippage (which presumes that 
recourse to violent means laid the necessary conditions for future terrors), to recap~re the truces, 
backsliding, pauses and outbursts as reflections of the ways in which revolutionary upheaval 
entwined peaceable and violent means at the same time precisely because it was so fratricidal -
not rooted in ancient discord. 
Second, to understand the escalation, it helps to pay some attention to the spectrum of 
modem violence, from the acts of avenging crowds to mass killing and wanton desecration -
which together reveal the ways in which criminalizing rivals and demonizing enemies were ways 
to extirpate the threat from within - and doing so would make society safe for revolution, and its 
twin, the counter-revolution. Both sides would conform to a natural law precept that the fight 
against tyrants validated the most extreme kinds of measures. While the steps and counter-steps 
varied (because Spanish America was not of a piece, especially given the radical ,decomposition 
oflegal authority), violence was central to the course of revolutions not because large numbers 
of people went crazy or got more fanatical, but because it appeared increasingly as the only 
means available to rid their world of threats and enemies. 
But why threats and enemies all ofa sudden? Here lies the third claim: the shift reflected 
and was fueled by a deepening crisis of sovereignty across the Spanish empire, which grew more 
lethal as it reverberated from the metropole where it began. In this sense, it was driven by a civil 
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war, defined as "armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between 
parties subject to a common authority at the outset of hostilities," occasioned by a break in legal 
authority, stoked by the fragmentation of juridical spaces, and intensified by efforts to restore the 
old order. In this sense, the fighting became more and more endogenous - severed from its 
initial causes and therefore more and more difficult to roll back. 8 It ended not on the battlefield, 
but when one side collapsed, and left to the "victors" (who, like Bolivar, were all too aware that 
this was a strange model of triumph, and not easy to convert into uplifting narratives for public 
memory-making) the challenge of how to reassemble the elements of fratricidally-divided 
societies into constitutional orders. 
*** 
Crowds, conspiracies, and collective banditry had long been the source of public violence 
in pre-revolutionary Spanish America; they were not patterned by a fundamental crisis of 
sovereignty, though they reflected an unease with which colonial subjects felt they were 
governed. Earlier "mass rebellions reached their crescendo in the 1780s and spread panic among 
colonial administrators - but the combination of commercial expansion and lifting some of more 
onerous fiscal demands on colonial subjects relieved the tension. Still, grievances and unrest did 
not simply evaporate. Authorities in Quito worried about the news of subterranean plots. They 
woke up in the mornings to find public walls painted with ominous warnings. "~YBERY, STO, 
FEL YCY7A 7EM, E7, GLORYAM, CONSECUENTO" announced one. Important intersections 
had banners and flags with a white cross and red lettering across the axis "SAL V A CRUCE," it 
announced. Flyers and broadsheets also carried the message that "sedition (could be) found all 
over Quito ... directed to hallucinate and provoke the Plebe," wrote the Viceroy. What exactly 
8 Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 5. 
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all this meant was unclear then, and now. But it did not prevent frightened authorities from 
arresting and interrogating a local school teacher. This was in 1794, shortly after the creole' 
publisher and tertulia empresario, Antonio Narifio, translated the Rights of Man to Spanish. 
Copies of it were now thought to be circulating in Cartagena, Santa Fe, and beyond. Viceroy 
Jose de Ezpeleta put his officers on high alert, lest seditious acts be more than happenchance.9 
By then, fear was spreading already. The French Revolution issues riptides of panic 
across the Atlantic world, and witch-hunts for Jacobins and their allies. But in Spanish America, 
especially in the slave belts, it was the specter of Saint Domingue that was the more frightening. 
The 1790s saw a spike in thefts and destruction of property, which inspired not a few to worry 
that this kind of activity was a sign of spreading unrest, especially among rural and urban slaves. 
Some of this appears to have aggregated into low-intensity social banditry; the late Alberto 
Flores Galindo has left us with an impression of late colonial Lima as rife with ambiguous 
tension - stable (in contrast to the upheaval of the 1780s), and yet simmering with popular 
disrespect for patrician property. But there were plenty of places where the stability was patina, 
little more. Further north, if authorities in Santa Fe were worried, imagine the concern in 
Caracas, where slave revolts and rumours of them - abounded. It was not only seditious slaves 
that brought concern: there were the occasional creole secessionists to worry about as well, like 
the botched conspiracy known as the Gual and Espana plot (named after the two schemers) from 
La Guaira. In the cache of discovered documents were Spanish translations of the Rights of 
Man, and copies of songs, some of which were meant to be chanted to the tune of the 
Marseillaise. One was called "La Cancion Americana," whose verses included some 
troublesome words: "". Viva tan sol~ el Pueblo/ el Pueblo Soberano.l Mueran los opresores, / 
9 Archivo General de Indias (hereafterAGI), Estado, Santa Fe, 53/55, 19/11/94, Jose de Ezpeleta to Duque de la 
Alcudia. 
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Mueran sus partidarios ... " The idea of slaying the enemy was already on some peoples' lips. But 
what worried governors most was a convergence of local Jacobins with slaves and Indians. 
General Mateo Perez warned his superiors that "we must not underestimate nor irritate mulattos, 
zambos, and Blacks with disdain and mistreatment!" Indeed, of the 65 men arrested in the 
conspiracy, only 34 were white - the rest either pardo or free Black. 10 
Warnings became prophecies: in 1799, the slave-coast from Venezuela to Cartagena was 
seized by a wave of conspiracies and local uprisings. One group tried to seize the Castillo de 
San Felipe de Barajas overlooking the harbor of Cartagena. Others took over estates and burned 
mills. In Maracaibo, there were rumours that runaway slaves and Guajiro Indians were preparing 
an army to assault the town. Authorities reported that slaves "quadrillas" were patrolling the 
country roads, seizing carts and pillaging white farms. One captured slave confessed that he was 
on a mission with others "to kill all Whites, to plunder the King's treasures as well as those of his 
subjects." The fugitives, once the lock-down seems to have defus~d the crisis, scattered into the 
social wilderness, leaving behind them the smoke of fear and panic. As the revolution on Saint 
Domingue finally drove Napoleon's forces from the island, boats of insurgents were landing 
around the area of Rio Hacha to join bands of rebels bandit squads comprised of runaways, freed 
plebian forces, and Indians. The bottom-up unrest was not restricted to slave provinces. Some 
of Jalisco's gavillas, formed in bars, jails, and gambling dens, graduated from highway robbery 
to social banditry. In Riobamba, Andean Indians bearing sabres and machetes confronted the 
Corregidor Xavier Mantufar in 1803, to protest his ruling ways. The turn of the century was in 
general a period less of coordinated defenses of "community" (as one might understand the 
10 Alberto Flores Galindo, "Bandidos de la Costa," in Carlos Augirre & Charles Walker (eds.), Bandoleros. abigeos y 
montoneros (Lima: Pasado y Presente, 199), pp. 57-68 & Los rostros de la plebe (Barcelona: Ed Critica, 2001), pp. 
61-102; AGI, Estado, Lima, 75/48,1796, Carta Anonima; AGI, Estado, Caracas, 71/2, 30/8/1797, General Mateo 
Perez to Principe de la Paz. 
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Comunero predecessors, or the more potent spasm of violence of the 1780s in the central Andes), 
but one of rising resistance to the more generic terms of colonialism in favor of expanded 
freedoms (of labour, of expression, from taxes, to trade). Yet, with only a very few exceptions, 
this unrest did not call for an overturn of colonial rule and monarchy, but can be seen as the 
exhaustion of a model of exploitation and the social underbelly of fiscal bankruptcy in the age of 
heightened inter-imperial warfare. n 
This was not how the unrest was seen by authorities, for whom sedition and 
insubordination were seen as preambles to revolution, especially after 1789. The authorities 
responded in predictable ways. One was to bolster local militias to patrol neighborhoods and 
countrysides. In the frontiers of the Banda Oriental, "Lancers" toured the byways between 
I 
estates to keep the peace. Squadrons of riflemen, often funded by merchant guilds to make up 
for public penury, were dispatched to put an end to slave flight from plantations. In 1794, this 
was a regular practice in Caracas, where the Consulado, for all intents and purposes, backstopped 
the colonial state in its effort to preserve social order and implemented and enforced a local 
passport system for slaves who were "off' th~ plantations. 12 
Seditious literature - including all books or newspapers printed in French - was simply 
banned, leaving to the censors the task of separating the legal from illegal tracts. Narifio's 
translation of the Rights of Man landed him in prison. The Oidor of the Santa Fe's Audiencia 
11 AGI, Estado, Santa Fe, 52/76, Pedro Mendinueta to Francisco Saavedra; 53/77, Report by Governor of Cartagena; 
52/84,25/03/1803, Mendieta to Ceballos; William B. Taylor, "Banditry and Insurrection: Rural Unrest in Central 
Jalisco, 1790-1816,", in Friedrich Katz (ed.), Riot, Rebellion and Revolution (Princeton ... ), p. 208-210; On 
exhaustion, see Enrique Tandeter, Coaccion y Mercado: La mineria de la plata en el Potosi colonial. 1692-1826 
(Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1992), pp. 253-263; John Tutino, From Insurrection to Revolution in Mexico: Social 
Bases of Agrarian Violence, 1750-1940 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), chpt 2; Richard L. Garner, 
Economic Growth and Change in Bourbon Mexico(Gainesville: University Press, of Florida, 1993), pp.37-71. More 
generally on bankruptcy, see Carlos Marichal, Bankruptcy of Empire: Mexican Silver and the Wars Between Spain, 
Britain, and France, 1760-1810 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 
12 Archivo General de la Nacion, Caracas (hereafter AGNC), Real Consulado, Actas, 2526, ff 37-38. 
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provided lurid nightmares to Charles IV's minister, "the Prince of Peace," to justify the 
censorship and incarceration - -which only confirmed the more general view in Madrid that 
Jacobin agents could be found under beds all over the empire. When the posters and other 
broadsheets began to appear on the streets, the roundups began. In spite of the protests, by 
among others the magnates of the Cabildo, there was no leniency. Eleven "conspirators," 
including Narifio, were dispatched to Spain to face trial (where it was felt that the courts would 
be free from the pressures oflocal subjects). Narifio, understandably, felt scapegoated, and when 
his appeal was rejected, he fled to Paris to become an avowed lifelong opponent of Spanish 
rule. 13 
These were preemptive measures and expressions of the manifold ways in which fear 
mutated into loathing. They represent one end of the deterrent specter. The irony was that 
Narifio himself printed only 100 copies of the tract, and when he heard that he might be arrested 
had them all, save two copies, burned. But there is also plenty of evidence of harsh justice for 
those who crossed the line. Those caught conspiring faced even stricter penalties, and even 
death sentences. The harshest treatment was meted out to those who did mount uprisings. After 
Miranda's failed attempt to lead a re~olution from Coro in 1806, his followers that did not 
manage to escape with him, or who did not slip away in canoes to Margarita Island, were 
rounded up. All were denounced as "traitors," dedicated to whipping up'the "gente reboltosa," 
and threatening to bring to Venezuela something akin to "the Black tyrant Dessalines." As a 
deterrent, ten of Miranda' s followers were summarily hung, their bodies left dangling from the 
gallows. The rest were sent to Spain to wallow in prison. This kind of violence conformed to a 
13 AGI, Estado, Santa Fe, 53/59,19/07/1797, Conde de Torre Velarde to Principe de la Paz; Anthony McFarlane, 
Colombia Before Independence: Economy, Society and Politics under Bourbon Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), pp. 284-289. 
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more general penal practice of shaming rituals, part of a broader "theatre of violence." Public 
spectacles of corporal punishment, from whippings to executions - a gamut of bodily desecration 
which were meant to dishonor the criminal, demonstrating the baseness and powerlessness of 
. the condemned and the might and glory of rulers. But social conflict is one thing; war is quite 
another. We are still far from a cycle of civil strife and terror, and certainly no breakdown of the 
basic colonial system; none of the violence had the "organizational" personality it would have in 
a few years' time; desecration and rumours of killing came nowhere close to the language or 
threat of extermination. It would take a specific kind of break in the legal order that would make 
enforcements that were once seen as the rites of natural justice to be seen as the exercise of 
tyranny, or plebian violence to be seen as more than vindictiveness. 14 
*** 
There was no shortage of motives for fear and unrest in late colonial Spanish America. 
Events in 1808 aggravated them all. Napoleonic armies streamed into Spain and Ferdinand fell 
into the French ruler's hands. Gone was the monarchy, the central legitimating symbol for the 
empire, and source of Christian justice for his subjects. With the King unable to rule his 
subjects, who, What, and how to fill the gap? These questions blew open the premises of Spanish 
rulership to spark a debate over who would rule at home, and then how they would rule. And 
this break in sovereignty changed the practice of political violence. The late·Charles Tilly, 
following an insight of Trotsky's, argued that revolutionary situations were those in which more 
14 AGI, Gobierno, Caracas, 458, 2 Sept, 1806, Andres Bello, "Observaciones sobre la situacion de Coro." The most 
evocative narrative of this model of justice is Peter linebaugh, The london Hanged: Crime and Punishment in the 
Eighteenth Century (london: Penguin, 1991). See also Gene E. Ogle, "Slaves of Justice: Saint Domingue's 
Executioners and the Production of Shame," Historical Reflections/Reflexions Historigues, 29:2 (Summer, 2003), 
pp. 275-294. "Theatre of violence" is from Robert Darnton, The Great Cat Massacre and other Episodes in French 
Cultural History (New York: Penguin, 1984), p. 99. This theatre could beboth comedic - in the sense that people 
could turn the tables in ways they thoughtfunny. But it could also be have a tragic mode. 
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than one power bloc exercised control over part of the state apparatus. Dual or manifold 
sovereignties provoke different classes, sectors and alliances to lay claim to state power for their 
own. This is what happened starting in 1808 across the Iberian Atlantic. The fissuring of the 
ancien regime did not widen under pressure from Jacobin plots or the revolutionary wars - but 
only when the inter-imperial rivalries blew open with,the coronation of Napoleon as the emperor 
of France and his campaign for European supremacy with a war to end all wars. 15 
If a break in sovereignty occasioned a revolutionary "situation" it did not determine the 
course; for this, we need to come to terms with the contingencies of the conflicts that ensued and 
the violence they magnified. As Spaniards and colonists grappled with how to improvise a 
system of rule, they set off a debate about local autonomy and representation, which cascaded 
into confrontations of who had :voice, how they got tO,express it, and where. The cycle upset the 
delicate equipoise of urban patrician models of political domination which only intensified 
, , 
authorities' suspicious predilections and in some cases, like Mexico City, reactionary reflexes. It 
took little time for the war of words to lead to violence. In July, 1809, a group of well-to-do 
creoles in Quito grew increasingly frustrated with the foot-dragging by the Audiencia, 
denounced the Viceroy's local officials, and called for an autonomous Junta to govern the 
province in the name of the king. This was not a declaration of independence but it was an 
affront to some royal officials. There had been arrests and verbal pushing and shoving; but now 
a harsh reaction was coming. The Viceroy ordered troops to smother the quitefio "traitors," and 
their leaders were rounded up. Lima sent 800 soldiers to patrol the city. More suspects were 
detained. While the government in Spain was debating new principles of representation and 
elections, Prosecutor Tomas Arechagaordered that the property of all the "rebels" be seized, and 
15 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (ReadingMA: Addison-Wesley Pub!., 1978), pp. 190-191. 
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requested to the Viceroy that they all be executed. Quitefios heard rumours that the repression 
would spread and lead to bloodshed, until a group Of armed men stormed the prison and released 
the detained. One guard died in the melee. Then, all hell broke loose. Soldiers opened fire on a 
crowd in the Plaza Mayor. Civilians attacked the presidio to get guns, but got trapped inside. 
Troops finally captured them, and shot them on the spot. One escaped. By then, fears of the 
Bastille-style crowd filled the minds of frightened Peruvian troops, who panicked and went on a 
splurge of assaults and killings in search of the ringleaders and their supporters. Using swords, 
knives, bayonets and their axes they found and slaughtered 28 of the men who were awaiting 
sentences, including some scions of the creole aristocracy. Spanish officials, who'd lost 
complete control, retreated to the presidential palace to pray for a miracle. The absence of 
authority led to days of revenge killing and retribution. Civilians began to shoot soldiers from 
rooftops and windows; soldiers responded in kind, and proceeded to pillage the shops around the 
now seething Plaza Mayor. President Ruiz de Castilla thought that a sign of force would do the 
trick to restore order and commanded that a hanging gallows be erected in the Plaza, and that 
disloyal subjects should be left to dangle without trials. In the end, it was the Bishop that 
defused the crisis, for the moment. The toll was about 800 civilians dead in the streets, including 
thirteen children. One hundred soldiers also died. 16 
These at least were the figures - and the images - that circulated at the time. Silence and 
, 
fear descended on Quito. But the news spread, especially now that censorship was lifted and the 
Inquisition on its last legs, provoking outrage. In Santa Fe, Camilo Torres seized upon the news 
of the killings in Quito to cajole the Cabildo of Santa Fe to issue a,Memorial de Agravios, which 
16 Restrepo, Historia de la Revoluci6n, V. 1, (Bogota: Ed Bedout, 1969) pp. 118-123; Jaime Rodriguez 0., La 
revoluci6n polftica durante la epoca de la independencia: EI Reino de Quito, 1808-1822 (Quito: Universidad Andina 
Sim6n Bolivar, 2006), pp. 71-73. 
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catalogued the atrocities and urged subjects to reconsider their loyalties, less to Spain itself than 
to its governors. Sanguinary news gave definition to a line that was once imperceptible. It also 
revealed how much the pattern of violence had changed markedly from that which poised 
colonial militias and enforcers against plebian sectors. Now, the violence was much less clearly 
isomorphic - breaking the association of enforcement with elites and resistance with subaltern 
populations. 
Violence also amalgamated new coalitions calling for secession to restore peace. 
Consider Cartagena, where pro-Spanish Regency factions were threatening since 1810 to roll 
; 
back local autonomy, and which tried to seize the governor's palace and mobilize the garrison to 
occupy the city. Several lower-rank officers leaked the plan; crowds took to the streets to 
preempt the coup, and called out the mixed-race militias and lancers. When Cartagena seceded 
from Spanish rule in November 1811, it was an interim claim until the crisis in the metropole 
could be resolved. But secessionists also felt the need to do so to reestablish legitimacy and 
bring an end to the carnage and its threat. The city's assembly issued an immediate and urgent 
call to disarm all colonial militias to prevent opponents from militarizing the conflict. The 
authors of the declaration framed their vindications in the rhetoric of sacrificial bloodshed: "We 
note with horror for our consideration the three hundred years of vexations, miseries, and 
sufferings of all types, which accumulated over oui: country with the ferocity of the 
Conquistadors and Spanish rulers."l7 
The polarization also gave rise to an ever-more intransigent rhetoric. Some of it also 
baptized the new autonomist movements with sacrificial imagery and warnings of a more 
17 EI Argos Americano. 11 nov., 1811; Aline Helg, "The Limits of Equality: Free People of Colour and Slaves during 
the First Independence of Cartagena, Colombia, 1810-1815/' Journal of latin American Studies. 20;2 (Aug., 1999), ' 
pp.7-8. 
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redemptive, totalizing war. Antonio Nariiio, who by now had plenty of time in Spanish prisons 
to nurse his enmity, returned to the printing presses. His La Bagatela was an organ dedicated to 
denouncing the venality and viciousness of Spanish authorities, and publicizing every rumoured 
repression, and invoked the epic choice in September 1811: "salvar la patria 0 morir.,,)8 
Bernardo Monteagudo tired of the Gaceta de Buenos Aires and founded Martir 0 Libre. In 
Venezuela, Juan German Roscio, otherwise a less intemperate figure than Nariiio or 
Monteagudo, also justified self-rule! to 'save the peace thiough legitimacy because the Spanish 
could only compensate for their illegitimacy with bloodletting. The selfsame blood, however, 
could also be the bonding agent for a new fraternal association: "we must recognize a legitimate 
Government and decide to seal with the blood of its very last inhabitants the oaths which have 
been pronounced at the altar of loyalty and patriotism." Mariano Moreno got practical about the 
need for blood-shedding for the revolution. Though he was asked to draft an outline for the 
makeup of a provisional government in July 1810, Moreno also dealt with the means to this end, 
and if necessary resort to gruesome measures: "we should not be scandalized by my words, to 
sever heads, spill blood, and sacrifice at all costs, even when they have all the appearances of the 
customs of Cannibals and Caribs.,,)9 
Demonizing the government meant that the violence could cut both ways. Indeed, no 
longer were crowds and civilian coalitions taking the place of governments to perform what they 
considered to be their dutiful obligations to subjects, especially food - the common image of 
early modern rioting from E.P. Thompson, George Rude and others but they were increasingly 
18 Restrepo, Historia de la Revoluci6n, V.l, p. 183. 
19 Juan German Roscio, "Alucaci6n del Reglamento para la elecci6n de diputados del Primer Congreso de 
Venezuela Independiente de 1811," in his Obras, V.2 (Caracas: Secretarla General de la Decima Conferencia 
Interamericana, 1953), p. 20; Mariano Moreno, "Plan de Operaciones," in Escritos politicos y econ6micos (Buenos 
Aires: Cultura Argentina, 1915), p. 307. 
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claiming to be the government, with rights to wield its weapons against toppling incumbents. In 
May and June 1810, the highlands around Potosi were swept by similar unrest over loyalties to 
splintering sovereignties. But when the news arrived to the mining center in November that 
colonial armies under General Balcarce had defeated Spanish troops at Suipacha, crowds took to 
the streets. One set off for the house of the Governor Francisco de Paula Sanz who had earlier 
squashed dissent. The Arequipa Division of Royal Troops opened fire - which, like Quito 
ignited an urban insurrection. By the time the smoke cleared, Paula Sanz was under arrest and 
the city was in hands of rebels. When Buenos Aires' Juan Jose Castelli arrived in Potosi, he 
ordered that firing squads execute the Governor and his associates. Vengeance begat more 
avenging. Lima's Viceroy Abascal dispatched armies to the incendiary the highlands to drive 
the porteno forces from the region. What is more, commanders were under orders to extirpate 
the cities of all sedition. In the mop-up operations from La Paz to Potosi, rebel leaders were 
hung in the main squares and their bodies ordered to be left to rot or be picked apart by 
scavenging birds. By 1816, the only republigueta to survive the savagery of Spanish repression 
was Ayopaya, whose gueITil~as, based in the towering highland hamlets ofPalca, Machaca, and 
Inquisiui, menaced the roads - and silver caravans - around La Paz, Cochabamba, and Oruro.20 
In the borderlands of the Banda Oriental, crisis of sovereignty was additionally 
complicated by the competition for dominion on the shores of the River Plate. The ratcheting up 
of conflict between rival autonomist and pro-Junta factions coincided with - indeed, occasioned 
- the rapid decomposition of the viceroyalty. In the vacuum that opened up, Portuguese armies 
were willingly sucked in, to give the disequilibrium an imbalance of its own. Viceroy Elio holed 
20 Ricardo R. Caillet-Bois, lila Revoludon en el Virreinato," Historia de la Nacion Argentina V. 2 (Buenos Aires: 
Academia Nacional de Historia), pp. 152-155; Charles W.Arnade, The Emergence ofthe Republic of Bolivia 
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1957), pp. 35-36. 
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up with his troops in Montevideo, and his fighters gave up all hope of a peaceable solution: Jose 
Maria Salazar, a royal naval commander, concluded that "no other methods than the force of 
Bayonets can pacify these provinces now." His enemies agreed. One of the military 
commanders, Jose de Artigas, gilthered his cavalry to besiege the port in an early opening of the 
city-country divide. His was a force made up of Lancers and gaucho volunteers and in the 
fighting that ensued, the distinction between formal and imormal warfare was as fluid as the 
alliances that fought them. The siege itself lasted almost three years, and turned the prosperous 
outpost into a hub of disease and famine. The clash soon gave way to something more chaotic -
and would only resolve itself by the late 1820s with the formation of an "independent" Uruguay. 
While Artigas' coalition broke up in mid-1811 (and some factions threw their lot in with the 
enemy when they saw the tides quickly tum), Portuguese troops began to mass along the border. 
This inflamed matters. The siege of Montevideo yielded to sacking and pillaging on both sides. 
Even Artigas' ranks began to fill with internal agitation; the massive refugee camp of Ayui 
seethed with anger and fear. To' assert his authority over the camp, Artigas ordered the public 
execution of three men on criminal charges. The war of attrition was such that no single group 
could assert authority until the Spanish finally evacuated Montevideo, by which time, the 
, 
autonomist coalition was at open war with itself. Suffice it to note for now that this war was less 
one conducted by standing armies but resembled more a high level of organized banditry and 
despoliation conducted by all sides. When Portuguese troops did finally invade under General 
Diego de Souza, they faced the dilemma of most occupying armies surrounded by an armed 
society: they too had to resort to burning and pillaging to thwart their attackers. Where entire 
towns evacuated, the Portuguese moved in, and began to settle their own footholds in abandoned 
counties.21 . 
21 AGI, Estado, Buenos Aires, 79/26, 04/12/1810, Salazar to Ministero de Marina; Agustin Beraza, La economfa en 
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The cycle from increasing intransigence to stepped-up vengeance and civil war was 
especially notable in central New Spain. In Queretaro, militiamen p~otted the overthrow of 
gachupin power in response to repression in the viceregal the capital, sowing the seeds for 
popular mobilization. Father Miguel Hidalgo, the moral crusader ofthe Bajio proclaimed: "Long 
live Our Lady of Guadalupe, death to bad government, and death to the Spaniards!" Four days 
later, his armies plunged into the Battle of Guanajuato, culminating in sacking, plundering, and 
the public execution of the city's defenders. While defenders were being mutilated, attackers 
broke into shops and began to parade through the streets - with a little help from pilfered alcohol 
- dressed up in fancy clothes; the festive and the horrific combined in a single secen of 
confusion. In one September fortnight, more than a million Indians, Blacks, and mulattoes 
joined the rebellion. Bishop Manuel Abad y Queipo, enraged that the rebels had painted their 
standards with the image of the Virgin of Guadalupe warned of a "mortifero contagio." "Terror 
panico" swept through loyalist ranks. As Spain's armies in New Spain stumbled in the face of 
insurgents, provincial cities emptied not only of their Peninsulars, but often all whites, for fear of 
the government's collapse. Queretaro and Mexico City filled with refugees from the provinces. 
While Hidalgo's forces had some hallmarks of armies, there was a way in which they more 
resembled a mass armed mob - a crowd of some 80,000 that was poised to seize Mexico City. 
Behind the lines (such as they were), a social order was in upheaval. Villagers seized haciendas. 
The owners and managers were routinely killed, their bodies desecrated. Local governors and 
mayors faced the same fate. One witness of the takeover of the Hacienda Nuestra Senora de 
Guadalupe, observed that attackers "were still stabbing (the bodies) with swords, and Santiago 
Cuenca cut off their heads with a long knife given to him by Juan Agustin Gonzalez, and 
la Banda Oriental, 1811-1820 (Montevideo: Ed. Banda Oriental, 1964), pp. 18-29; Pablo Blanco Acevedo, It 
federalism de Artigas y la independencia nacional (Montevideo: n.p., 1939), pp. 70-92. 
20 
Luciano Telles three them (the heads) in a sack and tied it to the pommel of his saddle." In the 
puebla of Atlacomulco, crowds rioted, looted, and killed four Spaniards. Outbursts like this 
multiplied across Central New Spain, and aggregated into a full-scale rebellion. Once royalists 
organized and stood their ground, the Army of the Center quickly turned the tide, and levied a 
series of devastating defeats .. In the hysteria that followed, untold numbers of civilians became 
victims of exemplary justice. After Hidalgo's execution in July 1811, his victor, General Felix 
Maria Calleja ordered that the corpse be hung from Guanajuato's granary where the worst of 
the rebel massacres had transpired - for ten years. After that, Calleja imposed a rein of fear. 
When he learned that people were tearing down his posted decrees at night, he ordered his 
soldiers to fmd the culprits. They couldn't. Instead, 40 plebeian men were arrested, and when 
none would name names, four of them were chosen by lot to face a firing squad. 22 
The fact that the cycle of violence in New Spain escalated so quickly and swept across 
such vast territories (unlike the more localized, and still largely urbanized clashes in much of the 
rest of Spanish America) helps explain what came after. By containing and then crushing the 
"insurgency" so decisively, Calleja succeeded in legating to the viceroyalty's patrician classes a 
fear of what might happen in the event of a renewed contest over sovereignty. This grand peur 
coincided, more or less, with the restoration of Bourbon authority in Madrid; for the next six 
years, it was possible to convey an impression of reconstituted imperial sovereignty, and so avert 
the kind of dynamics that ratcheted up the contestation in the Northern Andes and the River 
Plate. 
22 Hugh M. Hamill, Jr., The Hidalgo Revolt: Prelude to Independence (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1966), 
p. 142; Christon I. Archer, "'La Causa Buena': The Counterinsurgency Army of New Spain and the Ten Years' War," 
in Jaime RodrIguez O. (ed.), The Independence of Mexico and the Creation of the New Nation (Los Angeles: UCLA 
Latin American Center, 1989), p. 85, 90, 93; Eric Van Young, The Other Rebellion: Popular Violence, Ideology, and 
the Mexican Struggle for Independence (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 98, 129, and for the case of 
Atlacomulco, see chpt. 15 .. 
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As images of bloodbaths and news of plotting filled the press and fueled rumour mills, 
they could also turn inwards and stoke fears of treasonous behaviour from within autonomist 
coalitions. The difficulties that Artigas had with Buenos Aires - and the feud over whether the 
model of autonomy should be centralizing within the colonies, or decentralizing - replicated 
themselves all over. The porteno regime - understandably paranoid about Peninsular schemes 
for a "reconquest" and federalist uprisings in the littoral provinces - announced that all Spanish 
"horrenda conspiraciones" would invite the harshest of penaltIes and declared that Artigas was a 
"traidor a la patria!" His arrest ~d summary execution were ordered; his killer or captor would 
earn 6,000 pesos' bounty. Caracas was at odds with Puerto Cabello, Santa Fe de Bogota (as it 
was now renamed) fought Cartagena, and so forth. The feuding spread. As it did, the 
demonizing ofthe enemy that was once directed outwards turned inwards - and widened local 
fissures. That the competition for political loyalty mobilized popular sectors only aggravated the 
sense of declension among many of the original "patriotic" leaders, for the rebel populacho were 
not as menacing as the defenders of the Junta, but they were untrustworthy. Uncensored 
newspapers that once filled pages with news of a crumbling Spanish government and its cruelties 
in the colonies, soon began to report on the dangers of "the multitude" at home, and distinguish 
between popular opinion to be eschewed and public opinion to be nurtured. In Cartagena, the 
victory of popular forces over public opinion demonstrated precisely why they could not be 
trusted - at least from the point of view of centralists like Narino, whose La Bagatela was almost 
as vitriolic about the masses as it once was about the Spanish government. Events in Cartagena 
drove him to distraction. From the neighbourhood of Getsemanj, Black and mulatto militias, 
organized by the Cuban-born mulatto Pedro Romero,took up light arms and began to patrol their 
own streets to defend themselves against their own local authorities that wanted them disarmed. 
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The Getsemani battalions soon became the core of the armed forces of the city - and soon found 
themselves defending the city against Spanish attacks (mainly from Santa Marta) and centralists 
from Cundinamarca.23 
As local governments weakened, their publicists worried about the limits of the 
citizenship. No longer was the threat the enemy from without, but the danger within. By 1812 
in Caracas, the independence coalition traded accusations of treason, and on April 12 of that year 
the crumbling government promulgated the death penalty for treasonous acts. All opposition, the 
decree cried out, was treason because it was, by definition, an expression of particular interests 
against the general will of a newly freed "public." Monteagudo, a witness to the fragmentation of 
the region, pointed to the persistence of "destructive and antisocial" passions; for a people 
tutored only in centuries of tyranny there were no virtues. "A people who so suddenly passes 
from servitude to LIBERTY is in close danger of precipitating itself to anarchy and then 
regressing to slavery." The danger, he noted - -some would say prophetically - was that passions 
would "renew a more pernicious internal war against LIBERTY than one waged with all the 
weapons oftyrants.,,24 
*** 
Internalized violence begat despair, heightened suspicion, justified spying, and raised the 
temptation to deal with the growing instability with yet more violence. When the first 
23 Juan Canter, "La Asamblea General Constituyente," Historia de la Nacion Argentina, Vol. VI, p. 183; Veronique 
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Alfonso Munera, EI Fracaso de la Naci6n: region. clase, y raza en el caribe colombiano (1717-1810) (Bogota: banco 
de la Republica, 1998), pp., 179-192; Marixa Lasso, Myths of Harmony: Race and Republicanism during the Age of 
Revolution, Colombia 1795-1831 (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 2007), pp. 44-46. 
24 Bernardo Monteagudo, "Observaci6n," Escritos Politicos (Buenos Aires, n.d.), pp. 57-58; Gustavo Montoya, 
"Pensamiento politiCO de Bernardo Monteagudo," in his La independencia del Peru y la fantasma de la revoluci6n 
(Lima: rEP, 2002), pp. 152-188. 
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Venezuelan government crumbled in July of 1812, and prepared to withdraw, a handful of its 
younger leaders Sim6n Bolivar among them schemed to turn their president Francisco de 
Miranda over to the Spanish commander to face imperial magistrates. They were furious at him 
for allegedly betraying the cause (though there is some evidence that Bolivar himself was on the 
verge of switching sides preemptively). Miranda, arrested and taken away in chains, would 
waste away in a cell in Cadiz. The new local ruler was Domingo de Monteverde; by late 1812, 
Monteverde announced to his government that Venezuela is now "pacified." Like so many 
claims to victory in fratricidal conflicts, this was premature. Behind the lines, the province was 
in upheaval. Though the republican leadership had fled, local chieftains filled the void Jose 
Francisco Bermudez, Santiago Marino, and the mulatto Manuel Piar mobilized slaves and freed 
blacks in the east and eventually helped drive Monteverde from the capital. The see-saw 
continued; the second republic was even weaker, and more shortlived, than the first. What the 
cycle revealed was how each side was strong enough to neutralize its adversary, but was not 
strong enough to inflict a decisive victory.25 
What happened in Venezuela also reveals, in extremis, a more general pattern: where 
there was a standoff and the armed coriflict disintegrated the lines that divided camps from each 
other, warfare engulfed non-combatants. Marino, for instance, capped victories with butchery. 
After taking Cumana, he ordered the execution of 47 Spaniards and creoles; Barcelona saw 69 of 
its citizens shot. "The life of such men," he noted, "was incompatible with the existence of the 
State." Royalist reprisals were not far behind. As civilians and soldiers fled before the 
republican caudillos, they also regrouped. And they responded in kind. The Canarian 
shopkeeper, Francisco Rosete pushed back through the valleys of Tuy, liberating slaves along the 
25 AGI, Estado, Caracas, 22/11/1812, Oficia de Domino Monteverde. 
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way, and when he reached Ocumare his reliatory campaign ended with systematic desecration of 
civilians: noses, ears, breasts, sexual organs were all systematically and publicly sliced off the 
bodies of captives, ending with mass decapitation. When Bolivar got the news, in a white fury 
he ordered the immediate execution of every captive Spaniard; this was the beginning of the War 
to the Death. More on this shortly. The political violence reached a fever pitch at the hands of 
Jose Tomas Boves' Lancers, whose axial year of carnage became the core of Arturo Uslar 
Pietri's classic fictional account, Las Lanzas Coloradas. The Asturian merchant turned his multi-
racial recruits into a slaughtering machine which worked over the llanos in 32 months (until a 
spear did him in on the plains of Uric a in December, 1814). In units of 50-60 horsemen, they 
were organized not so much to win open battles with republican forces (though this did occur), 
but more to establish territorial control through fear, sweeping into towns and systematically 
pillaging, raping, and murdering its occupants into submission. This was an "acquired" 
propensity. Boves was not always a mass murderer; he became one. After he learned of a 
civilian plot to infiltrate his ranks at Espino, Boves sought revenge. He caught the plotters and 
ordered their execution. Even the whistle-blower lost his head. This was followed by a victory 
parade in which he stuck the heads of the dead at the tops of pikes and marched them around 
town with a musical band. At first, Boves wore no uniform, and often went shirtless. But by the 
middle of 1814 his vestments had become more formal, and his methods of terrorizing more 
elaborate. After the Battle of Victoria in June 1814 (where a trounced Bolivar had fled), Boves 
took morbid delight with his victory, mixing the festive with the funereal: he dined with a 
captured commander Col. Diego Jal6n, then publicly humiliated him before his fellow captives, 
ordered 200 lashes, then they all watched him be executed; his head shared the fate of others' at 
the end of a pike for all to see. The night after another battle, an insouciant Boves invited the 
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townswomen to a banquet, after which, whip in hand, he ordered them to dance while, beyond 
the walls, their husbands and brothers were rounded up and massacred.26 
Such actions illustrate the ways in which perpetrators wavered between the domain of 
politics and the realm of theatre. But one should not lose sight of the strategic purposes to which 
slaughter was put. Consider the way preying and pillaging became commonplace in the Platine 
borderlands, where power rivalries were more internationalized. Unlike the llanos of Nueva 
Granada and Venezuela, popular monarchist forces were for the most part hemmed into 
Montevideo; the furies of rural violence from a different source, for in the countryside it was 
Portuguese divisions that got bogged down in a brutal cat-and-mouse war with guerrillas. While 
Joaquina Carlota was plotting from Rio de Janeiro to reestablish a Bourbon monarchy in the 
borderland region with herself on the throne (in advance of her reconquest she'd sent a printing 
press, some personal goods, including, allegedly, her jewels), she had to wait for her armies to 
put down the insurgency, which was on the run by mid-1812. But the war had degenerated into a 
cruel exchange of guerrilla ambushes followed by army depredations of civilian hamlets; the 
empress's field marshal, Gaspar Vigodet defended his actions -noting among other things that 
his proxy war would free the Spanish armies to crush rebellions in the Andes, to create a vast 
multilingual coalition of regal armies crushing insurgents in the backlands to restore what the 
French Revolution came perilously close to annihilating: imperial monarchy?7 
.26 The work on Boves and his epigones is more extensive than deep •. For details, see John lynch, Simon Bolivar: A 
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For all the grand designing, however, on the ground the social situation was highly 
unstable - and in some places led to wholesale dislocations. Wherever the fighting became 
inconclusive and protracted, refugees filled churches and overwhelmed the meager supplies of 
the armies that could not protect them. As Boves' slaying frontier moved eastward, encroaching 
on the capital, panic seized Caracas. Families of all ranks began to pack carts and horses to 
prepare to flee. Bolivar gave the order to evacuate, starting with his own emaciated troops. 
Civilians streamed out of the city, and made for Barcelona and Cumana, starving, shoeless and 
petrified. Bolivar's troops could not defend them. The stragglers at Aragua were simply wiped 
out. Royalist troops went on hunting expeditions, killing refugees en route to Barcelona. Towns 
swollen with refugees became easier targets for the marauders, who did more than kill. One 
royalist chieftain, Francisco Morales, took care of Maturin, and gloated that he personally raped 
every woman of the town?8 Fear and flight also possessed the Banda Oriental, where non-
combatants also became excuses for target practice and bodily desecration by both sides. As 
Portuguese armies moved forward, burning and pillaging, the "Exodus" began: up to 80 per cent 
of the rural population - estancieros, merchants, peons and slaves - began their long march north 
to the littoral, where federalist chieftains were preparing their recruits. Meanwhile, Spanish 
royalists, plundered and immiserated in a blockaded Montevideo, also sought refuge fleeing to 
Brazil, and after 1814 back to Spain. News from far away could spark a stampede of frightened 
civilians. In early 1815, there were rumors that Ferdinand was sending his massive 
expeditionary force to the River Plate; all sides began to pack their bags for fear of an all out 
war. A resolution of March 1815 announced that all Spaniards suspected of collusion with 
Madrid's reconquista would face the consequences for their treason. Jose Battle y Carreo, for 
instance, fled, leaving his wife and children behind, hoping to rescue them later and praying that 
28 Lynch, Simon Bolivar, p. 86. 
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"that class of woman would not be persecuted." In September, Artigas began rounding up 
Spanish and Portuguese subjects, as well as his creole opponents, and herding them into a 
concentration camp he called, without irony, "Purification." Then he gave away their property to 
"free blacks, zambos, indios, and poor creoles" - proclamations that rolled off Princess Carlota's 
old printing press. When the Portuguese armies (once more with the complicity of Buenos 
Aires) returned in 1816, they trounced the artiguista forces, wiping them Qut in a succession of 
battles. But this time the Luso-Brazilian campaign was a longer and more brutal one; General 
Federico Lecor's anny became an occupation force. While the Banda Oriental had been 
converted into an embattled province of refugees perpetually in search of shelter, Lecor's 
divisions were surrounded by guerrillas, and so lashed out in the standard counter-insurgency 
style, at defenseless civilians. Fed up, an entire regiment of Artigas' plebeian force, comprised of 
freed slaves, surrendered on condition they would be allowed to seek refuge in Buenos Aires, 
where they were welcomed with open, if somewhat duplicitous,.anns. This phase of the 
protracted war ended at Tacuaremb6, with Artigas' final defeat, his personal flight to Paraguay, 
and the Portuguese annexation of the province to Brazil - setting the stage for another decade of 
conflict directly with Buenos Aires.29 
We are getting slightly ahead of our story. Body parts and cadavers became instruments 
of politics; public executions and torture were intended to terrorize non-combatants either into 
submission and loyalty or flight and exit, these being two pendular alternatives to the 
deterioration of public life, and eliminating the room for "voice" that had been such a prominent 
part of the contest over sovereignty in the immediate aftermath of the French invasion. But there 
29 AGI, Consulado, 345, 30 sept., 1812, Manuel Diego to Consulado; Blanco Acevedo, EI federalism, pp. 200-209; 
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was more going on than the politics of terror. There was an assumption that these lethal crowds 
also acted like magistrates issuing in their view - justice as a way to exterminate the enemy. 
What started out as a cleansing campaign against corruption, or shaming rituals by the hanging 
of a few royalists and rebels, had now become mass killing, with little discernable systematic 
social isomorphy; this was not a plebian war against aristocrats, or blacks against whites. Seen 
this way, we can rethink warfare of this sort - or at least the conflict in this context. Once upon a 
time, historians tended to see killing and maiming like this as a breakdown of "normal" war into 
deviant personalized vendetta - as a failure to cohere armies as prototypical affiliates for nations 
coming into being stocked with citizens in arms. But we might perhaps see it in reverse, as the 
endurance of a kind of rite that is more familiar to early modem historians, albeit with a less 
religious tinge to it: of extreme violence of crowds that behaved in mindful ways and who saw 
their cause as legitimate and their method as logical, of militarized groups with more or less 
aptitude to be regimented forces, that assumed the role of justice-dispensing magistrates where 
the state has collapsed. It IS a subset within a broader family-type of civil war. This helps 
explain why unarmed non-combatants got swept up in th~ fratricide with not infrequent malice?O 
"''''''' 
One anonymous limefio lamented to his sovereign in 1810 that the appeal of rebellion to 
many of his subjects reflected less the sense of ingratitude to the king (which could be remedied 
because all children could learn gratitude) than something more pernicious, and not easily cured: 
love of "tirania.,,31 While the view of rebels as more than mere malcontents, but as deadly 
30 Paul Friedland, "Beyond Deterrence: Cadavers, Effigies, Animals and the Logic of Logic of Executions in Pre-
Modern France," Historical Reflections/Reflexions HiSi:oriques, 29:2 (Summer, 2003), pp. 295-318; Natalie Zemon 
Davis, Society and Culture in Early Modern France (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), pp. 154-162. 
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agents, spread with the fighting, it is important to recall that all-out savagery was not its only 
outcome; it was hardly the expression of some pre-political logic, but rather was the function of 
the (im)balance offorces. Consider Peru, where Viceroy Jose de Abascal, the spiritus rector of 
continuism, snuffed out the rebellions with an·iron fist - and thus projected a view of how to 
dispense with those who loved godless tirania over the rule of a beneficent Bourbon king. 
Having driven Buenos Aires' armies from the highlands, Abascal assuaged the Spanish 
government that "we can restore in motion the minerals ofPotosL" What is more, he added, . 
. between his armies in the Andes, and the royalists troops in Montevideo (this was written before 
the city's evacuation), the government's pincers could now squeeze Buenos Aires' dominion 
back into submission. After all, he mopped up Pasto, Quito, and Alto Peru - and in the latter two 
cases leaving behind the trademark odor of excessive force, plunder and indiscriminate 
executions. And the news from Santa Fe and Buenos Aires regarding their imminent collapse 
only confirmed that only force would compel insurgents "to enter reason.,,32 
. Discourses such as these have enjoyed an appeal to those with a fondness for coercive 
solutions to political impasses, especially if they happen to favor their own lust for power. It 
certainly did for Ferdinand, who was determined to restore imperial grandeur. It also had an aura 
of plausibility. Calleja and Abascal were waging counterinsurgency campaigns in 
Mesoamerican and Andean hamlets. Buenos Aires was "free," but the littoral and borderlands 
were engulfed in civil war or occupied by Portuguese armies which served as proxies for Madrid. 
In Venezuela and Nueva Granada, fledgling self-rule movements collapsed into fratricidal 
conflict. It was in this context that the restored emperor chose to rebuild his empire by 
32 AGI, Estado, Lima, 74/2, 23/05/1812, Jose Abascal to Secre de Estado; 74/8, 13/10/1812, Jose Abascal to Secr de 
Estado; 74/51,25/01/1813, Marquez de la Concordia to Secr de Estado; 74/72,23/07/1813, Joaquin de la Molina 
to Consejo de la Regencia. 
30 
arrogating to himself the providential powers of the avenger ~ this, despite the anxieties of some 
of his ministers and warnings of some of his envoys that the delicate impasse was leaning his 
way without the need for a massive intervention. There was a political reason for this decision, 
to resolve Tilly's "revolutionary situation" - for the task of the revolution and the counter-
revolution is to reintegrate state power through the exercise of force. This is what Ferdinand 
sought. But there was also a historic memory (concocted in Madrid) of the violence that 
preceded the restoration, inscribed in consultas to the (restored) Council of the Indies, which 
argued that some "malvados" took advantage of the French invasion to take power for 
themselves, to introduce "libertinajeofthe press" to "corrupt public opinion" and "demoralize 
the pueblo." What were needed were a decisive crushing of "impiety" and "insurrection," a 
purging of "all the prejudicial novelties introduced to our'constituci6n indiana." The full force of 
the Spanish empire would be dedicated to a massive cleansing operation, to root out evil and 
corruption as conditions for a new peace premised on "the solemn and general forgetting of the 
past." A war to bring real peace. "Pacification" plans were laid to reconquer the provinces from 
rebellious infidels and restore the image of a "Padre tierno" among subjects who'd been seduced 
to forget his magnanimity. But for this, the king needed an avenging angel to deliver the 
message, to root out the sources of liberal venality, and to destroy the false gods of constitutional 
idolatry. 33 
The angel was Brigadier General Pablo Morillo, and his task could not help but erase 
what was left of the lines between combatants and non-combatants. But it would be unfair to 
charge the fernandina counter-revolution with singlehandedly turning the unarmed into victims. 
We have seen evidence that armed crowds quickly became important actors, and that these could 
33 AGI, Indiferente General, 1568,3 Oet 1814, Consultas del Consejo de Indias"; 2320, 7 marzo, 1815, Consulado to 
Seer de Estado. 
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mutate into plebian "armies," and that sieges and pillaging were becoming methods of anti-
colonial warfare on all sides. In Venezuela, the lines had become all 'but meaningless even 
before Morillo's expeditionary troops arrived. Republicans were on the run in most places. The 
targets became towns and cities, and not just their defenders. Morillo "liberated" Venezuela 
(which really meant wresting control from the royalist chieftains and disbanding their plundering 
bands a mistake whose consequences became clear later, when republicans like Jose Antonio 
Paez filled the rural vacuum with guerrilla forces of their own). A senior cleric, who once sided 
with the republicans in 1811 but was appalled by what followed, switched sides and applauded 
the pacification mission in Venezuela as the restoration of God's authority, and shared his own 
tactical recommendations for liquidating the anti-Christs.34 
The next stop was Cartagena, the gateway to Nueva Granada. Morillo's forces besieged 
the port of 106 days, with promises of food and mercy in return for surrender. Though many 
immediately swore loyalty to Ferdinand to avoid recriminations, Cartagena held out - and its 
leaders responded by pulling their SPl:il1ish prisoners out of jail and dragging, them through the 
streets before shooting them on the ramparts of the fort for the besiegers to witness. But 
starvation finally brought the city to its knees, and it surrendered. When Morillo marched in, he 
was greeted by the stench of death: 6,000 people had died from disease or starvation, and their 
corpses had to be mounted on huge pyres for burning to control the contagion. "The city," noted 
Morillo, "was a most horrific spectacle." A group of merchants petitioned the king, thanking 
34 AG1, Estado, Caracas, 18, 21/12/1816, Juan Antonio de Rojas Queipo sobre la pacificacion de Venezuela." 
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him for sending "a destroyer of our past anarchy, and real restorer of the peace under which we 
now live.,,35 
The "Reconquest," as it has become known, was as bloody as it was rapid but the 
violence was itself ~apted; Morillo was not vicious when he took Cartagena. To be sure, the 
siege decimated the port; yet, he had pardoned opponents. Matters quickly changed. The news 
that Venezuela had begun to unravel in the absence of the General was dispiriting. What was 
worse, the "liberation" in Nueva Granada was not going cleanly. It did not help that the Council 
of the Indies was internally split, and the King himself a relentless source of confusion. Morillo 
asked the Minister of War to be relieved of his duties so he could return to Spain, to no avail. 
Stuck now, with war on all fronts, or no fronts, his justice took a: cruel tum. On the heels of 
knocking offthe already hobbled government, the avengers sought to ensure that it would never 
revive. After executing the 25-year old President, Liborio Mejia, Morillo issued a public 
statement in November 1816 to the pacified Neogranadines, in which he promised a new reign of 
peace and justice (LOCATE FULL TEXT IN AGI). The assumption was, as with many self-
styled "liberators," that the popUlation was living under tyranny (in this case a treasonous, 
republican, ungodly regime) and that it was awaiting its deliverance. But in this case, 
deliverance did not mean leading the oppressed from the lands of republican pharaohs, but rather 
. . 
to eliminate the oppressors and purging the country of those who worshipped false idols. The 
script was a modified Exodus-tale: the proclamation was posted all over the capital, and was 
followed by mass arrests and systematic killings of men who were not just involved in 
republican rule, like Camilo Torres, but those who sympathized with it. The avenger signed 
35 AGI, Gobierno, Santa Fe, 961, 10 die., 1816, "Sobre el restablemimento del Consulado de Cartagena de Yndias;" 
Alfonso Munera, EI fracaso de la naci6n: region, clase, y raza en eJ Caribe colombiano (1717-1810) (Botota: Banco 
de la Republica, 1998), p. 212; Christiane Laffite Carles, La costa colombiana del Caribe (1810-1830) (Bogota: Banco 
de la Republica, 1995), pp. 236-238. 
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execution orders for the scientist Francisco Jose de Caldas. A Tribunal of Purification hunted 
down suspects, seized their properties, and "processed" their cases. Three hundred were publicly 
executed, many of their heads sent to adorn the central squares around the viceroyalty. 
According to Victor Uribe, one quarter of the viceroyalty's lawyers were executed in an effort to 
expunge dissident letrados.36 
In New Spain, while the insurgency of 1810 shocked and frightened the viceroyalty's 
gentry, the rebel forces were soon thwarted and crushed. But the victors wanted more than a 
battlefield triumph. They wanted vengeance and a deterrent. It is true, much of the Army was 
made up of Mexicans, which prompted its commanders to hesitate before ordering them to wipe 
out the rebels. Still, after the Battle of Calderon, the insurgent defeat turned into a bloody 
massacre. Calleja also knew that long sieges would immobilize his forces and prevent them 
from going others. Towns like Zitacuaro, Cuautla, and many others, were pillaged, burned and 
in some cases demolished to deliver the message to other rebel posts to give in. As Viceroy, 
however, Calleja recognized that terror could be counterproductive. When he heard that one of 
his commanders burned the towns of Medellin and Rancho de Tejar near Veracruz, he informed 
the colonel that "we do not wish to convert the country into a frightful desert and increase the 
evils that exist and the hatred with which measures of this nature are viewed." His successor 
found himself in the same position - and likewise wavered between appealing to loyalties and 
giving in to the temptations of exemplary justice. Summary execution of captured officers was 
standard practice. Anyone captured with weapons, or caught in suspicious acts, was to be shot 
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and the cadaver had to be mounted publicly. And if viceroys wavered, local commanders tended 
not to; their fears often led them to be much less squeamish about harsh measures.37 
*** 
Avengers enhanced the cruelty on all sides. In Mexico, royalist triumphs and repression 
deepened the hatred of gachupines. Jose Vicente Gomez began, around late 1812, to castrate his 
Spanish captives; indeed assassinations had acquired a ritualized quality as hatred simmered 
below the surface of the restored viceroyalty. This was the backcloth of Bolivar's proclamation 
of a "war to the death" in June of 1813. "Justice demands vengeance," he intoned. But at the 
same time he invited Spaniards to follow a "path of reconciliation and friendship," "to live 
peacefully among us" if they cooperate with us, and share fealty to the Republic. Those who do 
not will be considered an enemy, treated as a traitor, and "inevitably" shot. In a later letter to the 
Governor of Cura~ao, he explained this lamentable exigency. He bemoaned the "ravenous fires 
of war" and "the furies of unrest (that) agitate the remotest settler." After accusing the 
reconquerors of turning on their own "sons whom he had brought forth in the land that he had 
usurped," the Liberator felt that his crusaders had no option. "I resolved," he concluded, "to put 
in effect a war to the death, in order to deprive the tyrants of the incomparable advantage of their 
organized methods of destruction." Until then, Bolivar had usually rejected his commanders' 
requests to kill civilians, and had to reprimand those who sent him the dripping heads of 
captives. In the course of the escalation, however, the conventions of gentlemanly warfare had 
I 
to go by the wayside. John Lynch has noted that Bolivar viewed his struggle as now 
asymmetrical: Spaniards had adopted exterminating practices even though republicans had given 
impunity to Spaniards - an imbalance that put his cause on the perpetual defensive. Now, 
37 Archer, "The Counterinsurgency Army," pp. 92-94. 
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liberating armies were under orders to take and keep no prisoners. This was no longer a matter 
of deterring loyalists or releasing avenging furies to extirpate the enemy. It was an expediency; 
where fronts had evaporated and civilians were killed and desecrated, civil peace required a total 
war.38 
Warfare changed in more than just determination of its leaders; it also transformed the 
social composition of armed conflict. Some movements, like the casta-Indian uprising in the 
Bajio, were born plebian. But others mobilized popular sectors more gradually. Cotton growers 
of Guerrero's Costa Grande, mu]atto sharecroppers and Indian villagers, became mortal enemies 
of Spaniards, and formed the backbone of the province's guerrillas, which was crucial for the 
continuity of the insurgency after 1814. In the Oriental borderlands, Artigas' September 1815 
"Reglamento Provisorio" enlisted plebeians, and especially slaves and Guarani Indians to his 
ranks; 400 Abipones moved from the Chaco to take advantage of land being doled out. By 1816, 
there was a full-blown assault on estate properties, which yielded to the desperate plea from 
estancieros and merchants for an avenging intervention - and thus the second Portuguese 
invasion and its scorched earth war on revolutionaries. The Banda Oriental came as close as one 
might imagine to a cross-ethnic class war within a civil war as one might imagine.39 In general, 
the complexion of violent upheaval varied, depending on local conditions. In the Andes, the 
specter of Tupac Amaru returned. What started as an urban insurrection spread to the 
countryside - and reached deeper into lower social strata, shredding incumbent structures of 
indigenous governance. When reforms of previous years were revoked, and the power of the 
crown - and its envoys in the highlands was restored, villages rose up. In Cuzco, the royalist 
38 1 am grateful to Alfredo Avila for the account of Jos'e Vicente G6mez. "Proclamation to the People of 
Venezuela" (15 June, 1813) & SB to Governor of Cura~ao, Valencia, 2 Oct, 1813, Harold Bierck Jr. (ed.), Selected 
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cacique Mateo Garcia Pumacahua - a former ally in the suppression of the 1780s, and again in 
1808-09 responded to the uprisings in the ayllus in opposition to Lima's tribute and tax 
demands to fund the war, and gave the armed opposition some lethal cohesion. When he did, the 
uprising spread more quickly. A crowd ofIndians seized a five-year old Jose Rufino Echenique 
and his family from their uncle's estate south ofCuzco; one considerate attacker plucked the 
child from the mob as it murdered the rest of the family. In the ayllu of Ocongate, Indian 
villagers formed their own military unit which sweiled to 3,000 men armed with farm tools and 
clubs ("buenos palos"), while local whites took refuge in the church. But seasoned royal troops 
eventually crushed the rebels, capturing and massacring thousands of prisoners. Purnacahua 
himself was executed in front of amass of his followers. Abascal endorsed vicious reprisals. 
While Lima's armies eventually crushed the insurgency, the new Viceroy, Joaquin de la Pezuela, 
was still forced to lament several years later that "the opinion of the cholos and indios is not 
especially favorable to the King; and among the multitude of slaves they are openly siding with 
the rebels from whose hands they await their freedom." Montoneros prowled central Peru, 
guerrillas assaulted royal troops in the Mantaro Valley. The Viceroy's troops were deserting in 
droves.4o 
In joining sides en masse slaves changed the nature of political violence. Their claims 
radicalized ideologies. They manned militias and guerrillas. And they left old elites whose 
fortunes depended on their toil in ruins. But this was not a foreordained result. Peter 
Blanchard's work illustrates how in many colonies slaves remained loyal to the king. Ramon 
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Pinero joined Boves, "arms in hand" and "served with much love and faithfulness my king." 
Domingo Ordoy, a slave in Montevideo, petitioned for his freedom in Peru, having served 
loyally in the defense of the River Plate. And not a few rallied to Boves and his .commanders in 
Venezuela. The course of war, however, shifted allegiances. Revolutionaries trumped the 
supplicative ethos of kings with'promises of freedom. Rebel after rebel promised to release 
slaves from bondage in return for their loyalty to the cause. As Artigas' rebels encircled 
Montevideo in 1811, they promised freedom to all slaves belonging to Spaniards who joined the 
uprising. Francisco Estrada did, bolting from his master to march "under the flags of freedom." 
Not all slaves joined the revolution; some seized the opportunity to flee all sides, starting with 
their masters. As rebel armies neared plantations along the Peruvian coast, slaves gathered their 
belongings and hit the road. And yet, innumerable captives joined the ranks of the armies, and 
would rise up in them as the war dragged on. What the process of Indian and slave mobilization 
did was transform the original patrician struggle into a vertical one in which plebeian sectors 
shaped the fate of sovereignty; it raised and altered the stakes of struggle to more than a 
conceptual displacement of the regime, but a shattering of the legal fundaments that legitimated 
colonial exploitation. Early outrage against violations of a moral colonial code gave way to 
demands for equality that invoked ideas for new coda .41 
Mobilizing plebeian sectors turned countrysides into theatres for a protracted, unwinnable 
warfare for the Spanish side. The result: avengers found themselves on perilous legal grounds. 
In the words of one, "we are merely the lords of the ground we walk on." Viceroys, once 
heralded as saviors, were flooded with pleas from loyal subjects. Taxes, forced appropriations, 
41 Peter Blanchard, "The Language of Liberation: Slave Voices in the Wars of Independence," Hispanic American 
Historical Review, 82:3 (Aug., 2002), pp. 499-523 & his full length study, Under the Flags of Freedom: Slave Soldiers 
and the Wars of Independence in Spa~ish South America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008), p. 41. 
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and continued arrests became the source of local elites' obloquy. The Cabildo of Cuzco 
beseeched Lima to lift martial law and shadow of suspicion covering the region, and to respect 
the honor of its good sUbjects. Local appeals had echoes in the metropole, where ministers were 
growing increasingly anxious about the costs - financial as well as moral of pacification. This 
was most acute where the campaign had driven into the sands of a savage civil war. Reports 
abounded of atrocities. Without salaries, soldiers had to resort to pillaging. (SEE AGI FILES 
FOR DETAIL) Even one of Morillo's officers, Colonel Le6n Ortega, submitted a report to 
Madrid decrying the conditions of the army .. By November 1817, authorities in Cartagena issued 
testimonies about "the violences" committed by the expeditionary troops. The Secretario de 
Estado suggested to the Minister of War that a proper Viceroy be sent to Santa Fe; for too long 
the provinces had been subjected to "the arbitrarinesses of the Chiefs and Subaltern Officers" of 
Morillo's armies. It is an "anti-political system." But the proposal to have civilian authorities 
restore governance while generals took care of insurgents got nowhere in part because the end . 
to the armed struggle seemed more remote than ever. The king stood steadfast behind his model 
of martial pacification. In 1817 and 1818, the king sent out a personal "memorial" to all his 
officials in the Americas to spurn all peace entreaties, especially offers of mediation. By then, 
Morillo's troops were on their heels everywhere, royal soldiers were soundly beaten in Chile, 
Lima's war on the republiquetas was grinding nowhere, and trade arteries of New Spain were 
under constant assault from guerrillas. Back in Madrid, the king did not flinch, that is until the 
regime he sought to restore collapsed under the weight of his own costly determination.42 
*** 
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Political violence made the process of imperial decomposition more and more concentric: 
the global contest between empires ignited wars within wars, revolutions within revolutions. It is 
important to remind ourselves that it did not begin with an epochal, irreversable colonial break 
. with empire. What this essay has sought to do is to shine a light on the ways in which violence 
shaped the sequence that would bring down the fundaments of empire. Instability created a 
struggle/or power, and evolved into a struggle about power and the nature of this instability 
provoked all sides to violent measures to put an end to it. It was not the exclusive recourse of 
one side or another. Ransackings, public slaying, desecration of bodies, and violent humiliations 
appeared from the outset in all camps as part ofthe repertoire, or rites, from the colonial period. 
Moreno called for sacrifice and bloodshed in Buenos Aires, while his nemesis, Viceroy Abascal 
in Lima, did the same. The events in Guadalajara anticipated what would become more 
widespread elsewhere as the struggle wore on: human bodies would become the site for 
resolving the increasing polarization of politics and the radicalization within competing 
coalitions. Boves and Artigas may have been at opposite ends of an ideological spectrum, and 
the former was unarguably more morbid in the delight he took in victimizing on a large scale, but 
the point is: they both were prepared to turn people who were once their neighbors into their 
victims. This escalation of killing and mutilating needs to be put alongside the institutional 
improvisations of the era, like a free press and new practices of representation, as shapers of 
political life as old regimes fell and new ones emerged. 
But the escalation did so in a way that cannot be simply adduced to some basic 
psychology of a people who lacked civic traditions (though many like Bolivar would despair that 
what he had really freed were latent furies); we know of too many examples in history in which 
societies accustomed to living by civic rules quickly found themselves engulfed in carnage. The 
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history described in this essay represents a passage of a particular sort, from violence associated 
with acts of vengeance directed against particular agents (be they venal judges, predatory tax 
collectors, or rabble-rousing publicists) to avenging activities directed at groups. In the first 
instance, the bloodletting was more targeted, aiming to remove the wicked so that the virtuous 
may rule. But with time, vindicative violence gave way to vindicatory violence, which was more 
and more unbridled as people sought to set things straight by force to restore an old equilibrium 
or create a new one - and this was resolved less with a decisive triumph from one side, but the 
utter moral and fiscal collapse of the other. This is one of the reasons why the Morillo affaire is 
so revealing, for as the commander himself grew increasingly aware ofthe futility of his counter-
insurgency campaigns, he was less and less able to conceive of a plausible alternative that would 
still uphold the original purpose of the expedition: to restore the righteous equilibrium of 
colonialism. In the meantime, his own troops resorted to atrocities that even the king's ministers 
agreed were defeating the purpose. As the circular logic of violence would have it, the atrocities 
were waved away as the unfortunate price that had to be paid to rid the empire of all sources of 
instability.43 
These examples of collective violence are reminders that they are not necessarily . . 
"deviant" from the normal process of institutional politics, although they do have spiral features 
that surface when the originary structures of sovereignty are shattered. We can abhor them, and 
mourn the losses. But to treat them as the pathologies of ideology or the eruption of man's inner 
brutality misses the point and the lessons that might be derived from the histories of which they' 
were a part. For this reason, the accent is on political violence, which did not obey natural 
psychological laws or reveal the underlying mindlessness of large groups of armed people -
43 Stuart Carroll, Blood and Violence in Early Modern France (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 207. 
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whether they be angry crowds or petrified soldiers. It helps to understand the ways in which they 
thought what they were doing was legitimate as a precondition for performing and ritualizing 
savagery. We can remind ourselves of an observation made by Natalie Zemon Davis about a 
different context and time: "if we try to increase safety and trust within a community, try to 
guarantee that the violence it generates will take less destructive and cruel forms, then we must 
think less about pacifying 'deviants' and more about changing the central values.,,44 This was 
the challenge confronting the heirs of sovereignties created by violence - whose aftermaths face 
those for whom politics is still a matter of life and death. 
44 liThe Rites of Violence," in her Society and Culture in Early Modern France (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1975), p: 187. 
